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This  paper  examines  "evolutionary"  dynamic  behavior  in  the  finitely  repeated  prisoner's
dilemma.  It  is first  noted that the  "fitness" of cooperation  found  in the best known  simulation
of this  type,  that  by  Robert  Axelrod,  stems  from  strategy  set  restrictions  that  altered  Nash
equilibrium behavior:  Axelrod's restricted  game  has a continuum of pure cooperation  equilibria
and no pure defection equilibrium.  New simulations, maintaining  the finite game's equilibrium
structure,  are presented  here.  It is found that although cooperation  is ultimately  exploited and
extinguished,  dynamic  paths  can  "pseudo converge"  in ways  that allow  partial  cooperation  to
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Dist  Special A6 I1.  Introduction
This paper examines  "evolutionary" dynamic  behavior in the  finitely repeated prisoner's
dilemma.  Under the  dynamics  considered,  if there  is convergence  to  a limit (in  general  there
need  not  be),  then  that  limit must correspond  to  a  Nash equilibrium  of the  game  formed  from
the  strategies  in  the  initial  distribution.  This  will  be  verified  in  the  text.  For  the  finitely
repeated  prisoner's  dilemma,  the  implication  is  that  if  all  strategies  are  present  in  the  initial
distribution then ultimately only defection  can  "evolve".
This  observation  appears  to  be  contradicted  by  a  well-known  dynamic  simulation  of
Robert  Axelrod  in which  the  dynamic  path  seems  headed  for  a  purely  cooperative  limit.  As
will  be  discussed,  the  discrepancy  is  resolved  by  noting  that  the  strategies  employed  in  that
simulation  yield  a  restricted  game  with, on  the  one  hand,  no purely  defecting  equilibria  at  all,
and  on the other, a continuum of cooperative  equilibria.  The fundamentally  cooperative  nature
of Axelrod's  game appears  in turn to stem  from his having used  the strategies  submitted  for the
second  of his  computer  tournaments,  which  was  constructed  to  be  viewed  by the  participants
as an indefinitely repeated  game.
This paper  takes  up  the  question of what  happens  in  the  simulation  of a  "true"  finitely
repeated  prisoner's  dilemma  with  known  endopoint.  Of  course,  ultimately  we  expect
cooperation  to  be  extinguished,  but  this  leaves  unanwered  how  the dynamics  behave  short  of
the  limit.  For practicality,  this paper, like Axelrod's, must typically  consider restricted  strategy
sets.  However,  care is  taken  here  that  the  corresponding  restricted  games  share  the  finitely
repeated  prisoner's dilemma's  main qualitative  features.  In  particular,  in  the games considered
here,  mutual  defection  is  the  only  Nash  equilibrium  play  and  "defect always"  is  the  unique
dominance  solution.  It  will  then  be demonstrated  by example  that dynamic  paths can  "pseudo
converge"  to  distributions  in  which  partial  cooperation  can  prosper  for  extended  periods  of
time.  It  will  be noted  also that  this same  behavior can  create computation  problems  making it
imprudent  in general  to try  to  infer limiting  behavior from  a  necessarily  finite  run.  Finally,  it
will  be pointed  out that,  in  the  2-stage  game  at least,  path  limits all  correspond  to imperfectequilibria:  the  weakly  dominanted  strategy  "Defect Tit-for-Tat" (defect  in  the  first  stage;  in
stage 2 play whatever one's opponent played  in stage  1) is never driven  to extinction.
The organization  of the remainder  of this paper is as follows.  The next section  reviews
briefly  the  prisoner's dilemma.  Section  3 introduces,  and to  a degree  motivates, the dynamics.
Section 4 discusses  some  fundamental  properties.  Section  5  reexamines  the  simulation  run  by
Axelrod.  Sections 6 and 7 discuss the new simulations  run for this paper.
2.  The Prisoner's Dilemma
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where c  >  a > d >  b and  2a  >  b+c.  C  is to be read  "cooperate" and D "defect".  The  1-stage
game  has a  unique Nash  equilibrium  in  dominant  strategies,  namely  (DD), an outcome  which
is Pareto inferior.
As  the  stage  game  is  repeated,  the  number  of  possible  strategies  grows  explosively.
For s stages there are
22'-1
distinct strategies,  which exceeds  10l10  for s > 9.1  The diversity  of possible  strategies  suggests
that  it  might  be  possible  to  enforce  mutual  cooperation  in  equilibrium  by  a  threat  to  punish
(by,  say, a permanent reversion  to "defect always",  written DD) upon  seeing a play of D.  This
approach  can  indeed  elicit  mutual  cooperation  in  the  infinitely  or  indefinitely  repeated
2prisoner's  dilemma  (an  instance  of the  "Folk Theorem")  and  also  yields  a  Folk Theorem-like
proliferation  of  (perfect)  equilibria  in  many  finitely  repeated  games  (see  Krishna  1988  for  a
survey  of the  Folk  Theorems).  However,  as  is  well  known  (e.g.  Luce  and  Raiffa  1957)  the
approach  fails utterly  with  the  finitely repeated  prisoner's  dilemma,  at least  when the  terminal
stage  is common  knowledge.  While  the  diversity  of  strategies  does  generate  a  continuum  of
Nash  equilibria  (provided  s  >  2),  qualitatively  they  are  all  alike:  within  equilibrium  the  only
play  is  mutual  defection  at  all  stages.  Moreover,  although  DD  is  no  longer  a  dominant
strategy  for  s  ! 2,  iterated  deletion  of (weakly)  dominated  strategies  yields DD  as  the  unique
dominance  solution.2   The  absence  of  cooperation  in  equilibria  of  the  finitely  repeated
prisoner's  dilemma  is  a  consequence  of the  fact that  the punishment  strategy  and the  dominant
1-stage  strategy  are  one  and  the  same,  causing  cooperation  to  "unravel"  from  the  back:  in
equilibrium,  players  will  always  mutually  defect  in  the  last  period;  thus,  since  either will  be
"punished"  in equilibrium  in  the  last period, neither  has reason  not  to  defect  in  the  second  to
last, and so on.
Classical  game  theory's  sharp  prediction  of  mutual  defection  in  the  finitely  repeated
prisoner's  dilemma  is  at  variance  with  the  evidence:  the  "stylized  fact"  from  experiments  is
that  play  is  typically  cooperative  until  towards  the  end.  See  Selten  and  Stoecker  (1986)  and
also Roth  (1988).  The question  raised by  Axelrod's  simulation  and addressed  here  is:  to  what
extent  can  the  dynamical  system  used  by  Axelrod  make  non-Nash  equilibrium  behavior
"1plausible"?
3.  The Dynamics
We imagine  that  there  is  an  infinite population  of players  and  that in  each  time  period
players  are  paired  randomly.  After  pairs  have  played  their  repeated  games,  each  player  is
informed  about  his  payoff  in  his  pairing,  is  given  some  information  (possibly  incomplete)
about  the  payoffs of other  players and using  this information  he revises  his strategy choice.
3It is conjectured  that the  strategy  revisions  aggregate  into  a function  G on  the  space  of
n  n+i
strategy distributions,  namely  the simplex  A  =  (P  E R,  =  1),  where  n+1  is the  number
of  strategies. 3   Pi  is  simply  the  population  fraction  playing  i,  and  if  P1  is  the  round  t
distribution,  P1+  =  G(P t)  is  the  distribution  at date  t+l.  Loosely,  the  hypothesis  will  be  that
the  fraction  of  participants  submitting  strategy  i  will  go  up  if  i  does  well  relative  to  the
average,  and  down  if  it  does  poorly.  To  be  more  explicit,  it  is  helpful  to  introduce  some
notation.




For an  s-stage  game  A  would,  of course,  be  much  larger.  We  will  typically  be  considering  a
subhet of the  full  strategy  set, one  with,  say,  only n+l  pure  strategies.  If the  current  strategy
distribution  is  P, the  expected  payoff to  an  i player  is  (AP)o  the  i entry  in  AP.  The average
payoff in  the  population  as a  whole  is  P. AP.  If the  round  t  distribution  is  Pt,  the  dynamics
proposed is:
t-1  t  t  t Pi  =  G,(Pi) =  Pi(AP-
which can  be rewritten:
1-1  t
P  - P  =  Pi  [(AP  i-P t-APT.
Pt. Ap t
t+i  t  t
In  words,  under the  dynamics  the growth  rate,  (Pi  - P )/ P i, is equal  to the  difference  between
the  expected payoff to strategy  i,  given  the  current  population,  and the  average  expectation  for
the  population  as a  whole  (ignoring  the renormalization  term  1/P  AP).  I  will  assume  that A
4is  normalized  so  that A  _>  0  with  a  strictly  positive  diagonal.  This  will  assure,  among  other
things, that the Pi remain  non-negative.
The customary  home of these dynamics  is within mathematical  biology,  where  they  are
known  as  the replicator  dynamics  and  serve  as a  model of natural  selection  based  on  asexual
reproductive  success.  Areas of application  are  varied,  including  biological  evolutionary  game
theory,  mathematical  ecology  (the  replicator  dynamics  are  formally  equivalent  to  the
Lotka-Volterra  dynamics),  and  population  genetics.  Schuster  and  Sigmund  (1983)  provide  an
overview  of the  role played  by replicator-type  systems  in mathematical  biology.  The  book by
Hofbauer and Sigmund  (1988)  provides  a comprehensive  technical  survey.
The  success  of  the  replicator  dynamics  in  biology  does  not  argue  its  suitability  for
modeling  learning/imitation  environments.  The position  taken  here  is  that  the  dynamics  offer
a  relatively  tractable  "first  approximation"  to  modeling  those imitation  environments  in  which
the  probability  of a  player  switching  to  a  new  pure  strategy,  say  i, depends  not only  on  the
performance  of  i  (here  measured  by  (AP) i  - P.AP),  but  also  on  the  probability  of  i's
performance  being observed  (as  measured  by  Pj).  Nachbar  (1989)  provides  somewhat  more
detail  on  this  type  of  motivation.  Stress  should  be  placed  on  the  reference  to  "first
approximation".  No claim  is made  in  Nachbar,  for example,  that the  replicator  dynamics  can
be exactly  motivated in  this way.  The reader should also refer  to Crawford  (1988),  who argues
that  if individuals  play  mixed  strategies  and  adjust  their  strategies  according  to  the  replicator
equation,  then  the  replicator  dynamics  cannot  simultaneously  serve  as  a  description  of
dynamics in  the population  as a whole.  There  is an aggregation  problem.
4.  Fundamental  Properties of G
Denote  by suppP  the  set  (i I  P i >  0)  (i.e.,  the  set of strategies  to which  P give.; positive
weight).
5PROPOSITION  I  From  an initial  point  P0, if limPt  =  P* then  (P*,P*) is  a Nash  equilibrium  of
the game with  (pure) strategy  set equal  to suppP° .
The  proof  is  supplied  in  the  Appendix,  where  it  is  derived  from  four  simple  properties  of G.
The  basic  argument  is  that  if i  is  an  inferior  strategy  in  the  limit,  meaning  that  for  some  j,
(AP*)j  >  (AP*)i, then  i must  be  inferior  to j  near  the  limit.  It  follows that  Pi tends  to  zero,
hence suppP* contains no inferior strategies.
Two  aspects  of the  proposition  deserve  special  comment.  First,  the  proposition  does
not  say  that  (P*,P*)  needs  to  be  a  Nash  equilibrium  for the  game  with  all  strategies  present.
This  is  a  consequence  of the  fact  that  the  replicator  dynamics  never  introduces  strategies  not
already  in  suppP°.4  The  second  point  is  that  we  cannot conclude  that  Pi tends  to  zero if we
merely  have  that  i  is  inferior  to  j  near  the  limit  but  (AP*)i  =  (AP*)j.  This  observation
underlies the result on imperfect limits discussed  in section  7.
Proposition  1  is  a  known  "folk  theorem"  in  evolutionary  biology.  It  has  also  been
noted  independently  by  some  economists  (e.g.  Samuelson  1988,  and  Hansen  and  Samuelson
1988).  The  result  readily  generalizes  to  ~  dynamical  system  that  obeys  the  four  properties
used  in  the  argument,  whether  the  system  is  discrete  or  continuous,  whether  the  game  is
2-player  symmetric  (as here)  or n-player  asymmetric.  A  related  but distinct  result  is worth
mentioning  but will  not be proved here:
Proposition 2  If P* is a  stable fixed point then  it is a  Nash  equilibrium.
Recall  that  P*  is  said  to  be  stable  if any  dynamical  path  that  starts  near  P*  remains  near  P*
(the  path  need  not  actually  converge  to  P*).  Again,  this  is  a  known  result.  A  proof  is
provided  in Nachbar  (1989),  among other places.  Again,  the  result is very general.
The  reader  should  note  that  the  propositions  provide  no  guarantee  that  in  fact  any
dynamic  path  PI  converges.  For  arbitrary  games,  convergence  need  not  occur.  Nachbar
6(1989)  discusses  conditions  known  to  imply  convergence.  Briefly,  while  convergence  can
easily  be  established  for  strict  dominance-solvable  games,  weak  dominance-solvable  games,
including  the  finitely  repeated  prisoner's  dilemma,  pose  subtleties.  It  can  be  proved  that  any
path  in  the  2-stage  prisoner's  dilemma  converges.  The analogous  result  for the k-stage  game
remains  an open question.
5. Axelrod's Simulation
Axelrod's  simulation  is  presented  in  his  1984  book,  "The  Evolution  of Cooperation".5
The  stated intention  was  to mimic  his  procedure  of soliciting  strategies,  running a round-robin
tournament,  announcing  the results,  and  then repeating  the process.  For his matrix  A, Axelrod
chose  the  payoff  matrix  generated  in  the  second  (and  last)  of  the  two  actual  tournaments.
Despite  this  intimate  link  between  simulation  and  tournament,  the  game  of the  simulation  is
fundamentally  different  from  that  of the  second  tournament.  As  this  point  has  caused  some
confusion,  I will be  more explict.
From the  perspective  of tournament  participants,  the  tournament  game was  indefinitely
repeated:  players  knew  that  the  actual  length  would  be  finite  but  they  did  not  know  the
terminal  stage.6  Rather,  the  game  length  was  drawn  from  a  distribution  characterized  by  a
known  probability  o that  at any  stage  the  game  would  continue  for  at  least  one  more  stage.
As  co  was  set  high  (o)  =  .99654), cooperation  can  be  supported  in  Nash  equilibrium  in  this
game.  This may in  turn explain  the  highly cooperative  nature of the  submitted  strategies.
In  contrast,  from  the  perspective  of  the  dynamics  the  simulation  was  of a  finite  game
with  known  endpoint,  since  the  cells of A  were computed  for such  a  game. 7  If simulation  of
an  infinitely  or  indefinitely  iepeated  game  had  been  intended,  Axelrod  would  have  needed
either  a  different  choice  of  A  (with  cells  calculated  as  the  o-weighted  sum  of  an  infinite
payoff stream) or a change  in the dynamics  to allow  A to be  stochastic.
7Turning  to  the  simulation,  Axelrod  took  an  initial  distribution  1P )  that  gave  equal
weight  to every  strategy  used  and  computed  1000  generations.  The  well-known  finding  was
that  the  strategy  "Cooperate  Tit-for-Tat"  (CT'F:  cooperate  in  stage  1  and  thereafter  play
whatever  one's  opponent  played  in  the  previous  round)  was  ranked  strictly  first  from  round  2
onwards,  although  only  by  a  small  margin  (it  is  one  of  six  strategies  with  shares  between  .1
and  .15  at  round  1000).  The  plot  of  frequency  against  generation  demonstrates  considerable
monotonicity,  with  the ordinal  position of the  top  6 strategies  not changing  at  all after the  first
few rounds.
According  to  Proposition  1,  if  the  dynamic  path  converges  to  a  limit  and  the  round
1000  distribution  is  close  to  that  limit,  then  the  round  1000  distribution  must  be  close  to  a
Nash  equilibrium.  There  is indeed  a  Nash equilibrium  nearby.  In fact, there  is  a continuum  of
them,  supported  by  the  39  of  the  63  submitted  strategies  that  have  the  property  that each  is
never  first  to  defect  (is  "nice"  in  Axelrod's  terminology). 8  The  point  in  this equilibrium  set
that  is  closest  to  the  round  1000  distribution  lies  .01  (in  the  Euclidean  metric)  away,  in  the
set's  strict  interior.9  Since  the  strategies  are  nice,  play  in  every  equilibrium  from  the  set  is
mutual  cooperation  at  all  stages.  The  situation  for defecting  equilibria  is diametric:  Axelrod's
game admits no purely defecting  Nash  equilibria whatsoever. 10
It  thus  appears  that  the  fitness  of  cooperation  found  in  Axelrod's  simulation  derives
predictably  from  the  Nash  equilibrium  properties  of his restricted  game.  These  properties,  in
turn,  are  quite  different  from  those  that  obtain  in  either  the  "complete"  finitely  repeated
prisoner's  dilemma  (where  defection  is  the  only  equilibrium  outcome)  or  the  "complete"
infinitely  or indefinitely  repeated  prisoner's  dilemma  (where  pure  cooperation  is  one  of  only
many  possible  behaviors).  However,  there  may  nevertheless  be  substance  in  Axelrods'  basic
intuition  that  cooperation  is  dynamically  fit,  in  some  sense,  even  in  hostile  environments,  an
extreme  being  the  "true"  finitely  repeated  game  with  known  endpoint.  The  remainder  of this
paper  focuses  on  behavior  short  of the  limit  in  the  finite  game.  An  alternative  would  be  to
investigate  the  replicator  dynamics  in  infinitely  repeated  games  with  richer  equilibrium
8possibilities.  This  approach  is  taken  in  Hirshleifer  and  Martinez  Coil  (1988)  and  in  Blad
(1986),  both of which  consider a  variety  of 3-strategy  games related  to the  infinitely  repeated
11
game.
6.  Simulations of "Large" Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemmas
The  following  two  sections  will  provide  evidence  on  dynamic  behavior  in  prisoner's
dilemmas  with  two  or  more  stages  (the  reader  can  easily  verify  that  behavior  in  the  I-stage
game  is  trivial).  The  present  section  will  focus  on  a  6-stage  example  which  is  a  good
qualitative  representation  of my experience  with  "large" prisoner's  dilemmas.  I will discuss at
some  lcngth  the  degree  to  which  the results  found  are  robust.  The next  section  will  then  turn
to  simulations  of 2-stage  games,  which  are  of special  interest  because  those  games  are  small
enough to run simulations  with all  strategies  present.
For repeated  games with  even just  a few  stages,  tractability  requires restrictions  on  the
number  of  strategies  investigated.  To  retain  the  spirit  of  the  finitely  repeated  prisoner's
dilemma  in the  restricted  game,  the  simulations  I have  conducted  have  included  for  any  given
strategy  x,  additional  strategies  of  the  form  "play  x  until  the  last  period,  then  defect  for
certain",  "play x  until  the  last two  periods, then  defect  for certain",  and so on.  In  such games,
as  in  the  full  finitely  repeated  prisoner's  dilemma,  defection  is  the  only  play  in  Nash
equilibrium  and defect always  (DD) is the unique dominance  solution.





1) CT7  (Cooperate Tit-for-Tat:  C  in stage  1;  in stage  t+1  play whatever one's
opponent played  in  t)
2)  CTT until stage  6 then  D
3) CTT until stage  5 then D in  the  last 2  stages
4) CTT until  stage 4 then  D in  the  last 3 stages
5)  CTT until  stage  3 then D in the  last 4 stages
6)  C then D  in the  last 5 stages
7)  DD
For an  initial  P0  in  the  center  of the  simplex,  the  path diagram is  given  in  figure  1.  A
partially  cooperative  strategy  such  as  4  is  seen  to  prosper  for  a  time,  but  eventually  it  is
exploited and  overtaken  by  the  strategy  that defects  one  period earlier.  Ultimate  convergence
to  P7 
=  1 can  easily  be shown  based  on  the crude  condition  that  if ever  P7  >  15/16  then  from
then on  P7  increases  monotonically  and all  the other population  fractions fall  monotonically.  It
is  evident  that  termination  of the  simulation  at  a  round  short  of 700  could  yield  an  erroneous
prediction  about  the  path  limit  even  though  it  might appear  to the  researcher  that the  path  had
nearly  converged.  The path  displays,  in  particular,  "pseudo convergence"  to P6  =  1:  there  is  a
span of nearly  300 periods  in  which  strategy  6 gets weight  of .99 or higher.
The  mathematical  intuition  for  why  this  behavior arises  is  straightforward.  The  weight
on  strategy  6  persists  at  high  levels  because  the  weight  on  strategy  7 (DD),  the  strategy  that
exploits  6, falls  to  roughly  10-30  by  round  288.  Since  strategy  7 does only slightly  better  in  a
population  of 6s  than does  6 itself, it  takes roughly  300 rounds  for the  population  weight  on  7
to  recover.  In  turn,  the  magnitude  of  the  fall  in  P  stems  from  the  fact  that  DD  is  a  poor 7
response,  indeed  the  worst  (available)  response,  to  any  population  distribution  where  mass  is
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is  less than  one.  But  P  =  P  r  (Pt),  so  if for all  v  in  some  time  interval  {0,...,V}  we  have
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r  (P  )  <  K  <  1, for  some  positive  K,  then  P  is less  than  K  P  , which  can rapidly  become
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very small.  As  it happens,  r  (Pt  falls  to  a low of roughly  .59  at round  24, climbs only  to  .73 7
by round  100, and  was still only .92 at round  200.
Is  figure  1 robust?  This question  will occupy  the remainder  of the  present section.  The
short  answer  is  "definitely  yes"  with  respect  to  changes  in  basic  data  such  as  the  initial
distribution,  "more  or  less  yes"  with  respect  to  certain  changes  in  the  dynamics  and  the
associated  learning  story.
Taking  the  latter point first,  the current story  states  that during  the  300 rounds in which
strategy  6 predominates,  the  superior performance  of strategy  DD remains  unknown to  the vast
majority  of  players  for  the  simple  reason  that  DD  players  are  rare  and  hence  infrequently
observed.  One  might  conjecture,  as  an  alternative,  that  at  least  some  players,  having  met
strategy  6  players  exclusively  for  tens  if not  hundreds  of consecutive  rounds,  would  analyze
the  normal  form directly  and  switch  to DD without  benefit of example.
Suppose  we  change  the  dynamics  by  assuming  that,  while  the  behavior  of most  of the
population  remains  described  by  G,  a  fraction  E  of  the  population  is  composed  of
well-informed  and computationally  proficient  "analyzers"  who play  in period  t+1  the  best pure
strategy  response  to  P1 (i.e.  these  players  act according  to  the Cournot  taitonnement,  on  which
see  Moulin  (1986)).  The  effect of  the  analyzers  is to  ensure  that the  population  weight on  the
best current  strategy is  never  less  than E.  The  consequence  of this change  is what one expects:
-30
for  e  >  10  , intervals  in  which  strategies  5  or 6 are close  to  1 are shorter (if they exist at all)
-6
and approximate  convergence  to  P7  =  1 occurs  earlier.  For example, setting  £  at  10  reduces
11the  interval  during  which  P6  >  .99  from  nearly  300  rounds  to  only  4;  consequently,  the  first
round in which  P7 >  .99 drops by more  than half (310  versus 667).
The reader should note  that,  strictly  speaking,  the  path  in  figure  1 is  nevertheless  robust
to  the  analyzer  perturbation:  although  the  path  is  sensitive  to  small  E, the  impact  of  the
perturbation  all  but  disappears  if  E falls  below  10-30  (admittedly  a  very  small  number).
-. 6
Moreover,  the  degree  of  sensitivity  to  small  e should  not  be  overstressed.  With  E =  10  as
above,  the  path  resembles  a  "compressed"  version  of that  of figure  1  in  particular,  it  remains
true  that  there  is  an  interval  in  which  strategy  4  prospers,  followed  by  a  regime  of 5, then  one
of 6,  and  finally  convergence  to  7.  Thus  something  rather  like  figure  1 can  still  be  obtained
even with  the addition  of a "modest" number of analyzers.
As  noted,  with  respect  to  changes  in  the  basic  data  one  can  assert  the  robustness  of
figure  1 with  considerably  more  vigor.  In  the  case  of  the  initial  distribution,  not  only  is  the
figure  essentially  unaltered  by  sufficiently  small changes  but  we can even  say that  the behavior
shown  is,  in  a  precise  sense,  probable.  Specifically,  if  we  take  every  starting  point  in  the
interior of the simplex  as being equally  likely then  the probability  is roughly  2/3  that  1) P5 will
exceed  .99 at some  point  in  the  path  and  2)  following  that,  there  will  be  a  stretch  of at  least
200 rounds  in  which  P6  >  .99.  Conversely,  the  probability that  P7  will  be  less  than,  say,  10 -6
after 300 rounds  is roughly 75%,  rising  to 90%  if we  stop  the  simulation  at round  100.  (These
probabilities  are  Monte  Carlo estimates, for a sample  size of 1000.)
The  behavior  expressed  in  figure  1 appears  also  to  be  robust  to  small  changes  in  the
payoff  matrix,  to  the  introduction  of  more  complex  strategy  sets  (although  given  the  huge
number  of  strategies  this  is  a  conjecture  rather  than  an  assertion),  and  to  increases  in  the
number  of  stages. 12  On  the  last,  an  increase  in  the  number  of  stages  yields  a  path  that  is
analogous  to  figure  1 but  more  extreme.  In  particular,  the  fall  in  the  population  share  playing
DD  can  become  so  severe  that  problems  arise  with  computer  underflow,  wherein  one's
software  arbitrarily  sets  any  number  below  some  cutoff,  roughly  10 - 300  in  the  case  of  the
package  I used,  equal  to  zero.  In effect,  the  software  decides  that  any  population  that  small
12becomes  extinct,  rendering  further  computation  meaningless  from  the  standpoint  of a  strict
interpretation  of the dynamical  system.
Superficially,  underfiow  may  appear  to  be  a  non-problem  since  one  might  argue  that
the  imposition  of  an  "extinction  threshold"  is  "realistic".  However,  to  the  degree  that
extinction  makes  a  qualitative  difference  (i.e.  substantially  alters  dynamic  behavior),  it  works
its effect  by  exploiting  one  of the replicator  dynamics  least appealing  features,  namely  the  "no
creation"  property  that  once  a  strategy  i  is  extinguished  it  disappears  forever.  In  the
interpretation  maintained  here,  "no creation" stems  from  an  implicit assumption  that  no one in
the  population  has  the  informational  or computational  resources  to reinvent  extinct  strategies.
As  an  example,  suppose  that  in  the  game  of  this  section  we  set  an  extinction  threshold  of
between  10-1°  and  10-30.  Then  for an  inital  PO  in  the center of the  simplex  we  get  a  limit of
P*  =  1, we  get  cooperation  for  one  period.  This  is  simply  a  consequence  of  the  fact  that
6
strategy  7 dies off before  it gets  a chance  to exploit 6.  Not surprisingly,  this  kind  of behavior
does  not persist  under  the  introduction of an  e subpopulation  of "analyzers"  (naturally  c would
have  to be  set above  the threshold  level  to have  an  effect).  An  alternative  would  be  to allow
for  the  periodic  introduction  of  small  "mutant"  populations.  As  should  be  intuitive,  periodic
mutution  will  restore  dynamic behavior  to  something more or less like  that displayed in  figure
1, with eventual convergence  to P* =  1.13
7
7.  Simulations  of  the  2-Stage  Prisoner's  Dilemma
Figure  l's most striking  feature,  the  "pseudo convergence"  to  a non-Nash  equilibrium,
can  be  obtained  when  there  are only  2  stages.  However,  2-stage  examples  seem  to require
starting points  that  are extreme  (e.g.,  that  place  most  weight  on  C').  Rather than  dwell  on
this  point,  it  is  more  fruitful  to  observe  that  even  with  a  2-stage  game  it  is  easy  to  find
circumstances  in  which  dynamic  paths  remain  far  from  their  limits  for  extended  periods  of




These  payoffs  were chosen  to  keep  the  relative  reward  for defecting  low,  so that  to  a  limited
degree  the 2-stage  payoffs  resemble  those  generated  by  a  longer game.  The two-stage  game
has  8  distinct pure strategies:
1) C always
2)  CTr
3)  C in the  first stage  then  "reverse tit-for-tat":  D if
one's opponent played C and vice versa
4) C and then  D
5)  D  and then C
6)  D and  then tit-for-tat  (DTT)
7)  D and  then reverse tit-for-tat
8)  DD.
The  path  for  a  PO  that  gives  equal  weight  to each  strategy  is depicted  in figure  2.  Ultimately,
the  path  converges  (Proposition  2  in  Nachbar  1989),  and  it  is  to  the  mixed  strategy  Nash
equilibrium  given,  approximately,  by  P*  =  .0029 and  P*  =  .9971.  Nearby  starting  points give
6  8
similar,  though  not  identical,  path  patterns,  as do  nearby  stage  payoff matrices.  In  particular,
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Ia  QI  --strategy  4  will  maintain  a  large  population  share  late  into  the  simulation.  For  example,  a
Monte Carlo  simulation  gives  a  probability of roughly  80%  that P 4  >  1/3  at round  800.
The  limit  of  the  path  in  this  example  is  not  subgame  perfect:  DTT allows  the
possibility  of cooperation  at  stage  2 whereas  the  dominant  strategy  at  that  stage  is  to  defect.
One  might  conjecture,  based  on  the  6-stage,  7  strategy  example  above,  that  as  a  general
principle  the  evolutionary  dynamic  would drive  weakly  dominated  strategies  (such  as  DTT)  to
zero.  However, this  logic  is  invalid  in  the  presence  of payoff matrix  ties.  In  matrices  derived
from  extensive  form  games,  of which  the  finitely  repeated  prisoner's  dilemma  is  an  example,
such  ties can be endemic.  Here,  they  lead  not only  to imperfect  limits  but to the  following:
FACT  For any  I-stage  payoff matrix  which  is  admissible  (i.e.  is  non-negative),  P8  = 1 is  not
the limit of any path  from the  interior of the  simplex.
Because  every  dynamic  path  from  the  interior  of  the  simplex  converges  (Nachbar  1989),  the
fact  implies that  for  these  particular  dynamics DTT  is  "evolutionarily  fit"  in  a strong  sense:  it
is  never driven  (completely)  to extinction  from  any  starting  point.  A  proof  is provided  in  the
Appendix.  The  basic  reasoning  behind  the  result  is  that  although  DD  weakly  dominates
strategy  DTT,  it  does  so  only  if other  strategies  get  positive  weight,  and  under  the  dynamics
used  here  those strategies  are going  to zero geometrically.
8.  Conclusion
Ultimately,  the  merit  of  any  "evolutionary"  argument  for  games  played  by  humans
depends  on  whether  the  evolutionary  story  can  be  given  a  credible  foundation.  The  present
paper  has  largely  finessed  this  issue,  focusing  instead  on  the  consequences  of  such  an
approach.  It  has  been shown  that,  in terms  of limit  properties,  the replicator dynamics  offer no
15relief  if  Nash  equilibrium  behavior  is  deemed  undesirable.  The  dynamics  offer  more  hope
short  of  the  limit:  convergence  to  approximate  Nash  equilibrium  behavior  can  be  slow  and
there  may  be pseudo convergence  to a distribution  which  is not a Nash equilibrium.  A caution
should  be  mentioned  here.  The  system  given  by  G  is  invertible, 14  hence  every  point  in  the
interior  of  the  strategy  simplex  is  a  possible  population  distribution  at  round,  say,  1,000.
Consequently,  to  be  meaningful,  statements  about distribution  after  a  finite  number of rounds
must be  phrased  in terms of the probability of hitting a particular region  (unless, of course,  one
can  be very  confident about  the choice  of P0).
Arguments  based  on  evolutionary  limits  become  attractive  when  the  task  is  not  to
explain  non-Nash  equilibrium  behavior  but  rather  to  discriminate  among  a  profusion  of Nash
equilibria.  One  can  argue  for  the  "plausibility"  of  one  equilibrium  over  another  based  on
stability,  size of basin of attraction  (union  of all paths  converging  to the  given limit) and so on.
This  is  the  spirit  of  the  analytical  section  of Axelrod's  book,  which  deals  exclusively  with
selecting  among  the  plethora  of  equilibria  available  in  the  infinitely  repeated  prisoner's
dilemma.  This  approach  is  taken  also  in  Hirshleifer  and  Martinez  Coil  (1988),  and  in  Blad
(1986),  already  mentioned  in the text.  Finally,  the reader is directed  to the  papers  by Friedman
(1988),  by  Samuelson  (1988),  and  by  the  present  author,  which  analyze  broad  classes  of
evolutionary  dynamical  systems,  of which  the  replicator dynamics  investigated  here  is but one
representative.
16APPENDIX
PROOF  OF PROPOSITION  The  proof  is easy  after  one  has  noted  that,  with  the  restrictions
imposed  on  A  (namely  that  it  be  non-negative  with  a  strictly  positive  diagonal),  we  have  the
following properties.
n
1)  G  is continuous  oH  A
2)  G  is  "responsive":  G(P)  =  P  iff  (AP).= (AP)  for all  ij  E suppP.  Thus,  the  fixed
I  j
points of G  have  the  property  that  they are  Nash equilibria  with  respect to  themselves,  but  not
n
necessarily  with  respect  to  the  full  strategy  set.  For example,  any  vertex  of A  is,  trivially,  a
fixed point of the replicator  dynamics, whether or not  it corresponds  to a  Nash equilibrium.
t+l
3)  The  system  is forward  invariant:  Pi  = GIP t)  > 0  iff  P  > 0.  In  words, strategies
are  neither created nor, except  "in  the limit",  destroyed.
4)  The  system  obeys  a  boundary  rule:  If  P0  >  0,  P0  >  0  and  for  some  T,  (APr)  > i  j
(APt)  for t >  T, then  limP t = 0  implies  limP t = 0.  In  words, if Pt gets driven  to zero then  so
J  i  j 
do  all  inferior  strategies.  The  boundary  property  is  proved  below  as  a  separate,  and  easy,
Lemma.
These  properties  noted,  suppose  P*  is  not  a  Nash  equilibrium  with  respect  to  suppP.
Then  there  are  pure  strategies  ij  such  that  (AP*)  >  (AP*)  , with  i e  suppP0  and j  E suppP*.
Then  by continuity,  (AP t)  >  (APr)  for t > T, some T sufficiently  large  (and  by invariance  P  >
i  j  i
0  and  Pt > 0).  Hence  by  the  boundary  rule,  P*  > 0  implies  that  P*  >  0.  But then  since  G is
J  i  i
responsive  G(P*) # P*,  hence  P*  is  not  a  fixed  point and  so,  since  G  is  continuous, it is not  a
limit point.  The proof follows  by contraposition.1l
LEMMA  The replicator  dynamic obeys the  boundary property.
Proof  The rnplicator dynamic obeys:
t+lI  t  t+lI
Pi  - Pi> Pi  - P  iff  (AP).> (AP)
Pt  pt 
i  J
(as  always,  assuming  Pt >  0,  Pt >  0).  Thus,  the  growth  rate  of strategy  i  exceeds  that  of  j
i  J
17iff  i  has  a  higher payoff than  j.  Under  the  conditions  of the  boundary  property,  and  thanks
also to invariance,  we  then  have that  the ratio  PtP  is well-defined  and  strictly  increasing for
t > T.  The result follows.I
PROOF OF FACT  Let  P*  be given  by P8  =  1.  It is easy  to verify  that the  Nash  equilibria  of
the  game occupy  a closed, nontrivial  segment of the  edge  between 6 and  8, with  P* occupying
one  endpoint.  To show  that  P*  cannot  be an  ecological  solution,  consider  the  ratio  Ps/P6.  pt
- P*  implies that  this ratio  tends  to  o.  The  proof  will  proceed  by  showing  that  if Pt  - p,
then  this ratio remains  bounded, a contradiction.
To  show that  P8/P6  is bounded,  we majorize  this  sequence  by another sequence that  we
know to be  bounded.  Note  first that for every  strategy i except  6 and  8, there is a number  0 i  E
(0,1)  such that (AP D  /(P. AP Di <  03,  provided  t exceeds  some  large number,  say 'ti (this follows
since  by  assumption  Pt  _ p* and  since  a8 j  >  a88  for  all j  other  than  6  and  8;  aij  being  the
generic  entry  in  A).  We  take  a  common  0  <  1 and  a common  threshold  't that  serves  for all
such  i.  Next,  denote  by et> 0  the  total  weight  at t on  all  strategies  other  than  6  and  8.  It  is
convenient  to denote  El simply  by E. Then  e-+ t+ 1 <  Prr'+t  <  P  t+lF.  Finally, let  B be  the  highest
possible  (expected) payoff to  8 conditional  on 8 playing  against one  of the six  strategies  other
than  6  or  8.  Similarly,  let  C  be  the  lowest  possible  (expected)  payoff  to  6  conditional  on  6
playing one of the other six strategies.  The precise values of B  and  C do not  matter, only that
they are  independent of t and  that B  >  C > 0.  With this  noted:
T+  t1+  1+t
P8  < (F(1-f3s)  +  Bos).  P8
P 6-'  (F(l-jVc)  +  CjpsE)  ,T+t P6  P
where  F  (for  "Fink";  >  0)  is  the  payoff  to  6 or  8  from  mutual  defection.  Proceeding  in  this
18way we  have:
T+  t+1  t +1
P  8   t  (F (l  _ PSc  )  +  B  s  )  .P  8
T -I  (F(1-13tE)  +  Cs  )I  V
P6  sP
We  need  to  show  that  the  term  in  brackets  is  bounded.  (This  will  show  that  in  fact  the  term
converges,  since  the  bracketed  term  is  non-decreasing,  given  that  B  >  C.)  Intuitively,  it  is
clear that the term  should converge,  since as  s goes  to  - the ratio goes  "geometrically" to  F/F =
1.  Rigorously,  we  show  that  the  product  is  majorized  by  another  product  which  converges.
We  need  to establish  some  additional  inequalities.  Note  first  that  we  can  assume  without  loss
ot generality that F  =  1.  Let then:
V(s)  =  I-PsE  +  B
1-13E + c13
Thus,  in  our new  notation  we  are  interested  in  lim  [I  V(s).  Let  8  =  B  - C >  0.  Then  adding
and subtracting  C3sE in the numerator  we  have:
-1+  8PsE
I  +CP SE-3 iE
Since C > 0 and  since  3s <  P,  we have:
<1+  8P  sr  <I+  8se
I  -13  I - PE
=  1  + 6"PS3
where  8*  -/(a-1k)  > 0, a constant.
19Now  nI  V(s)  tends to  if and  only  if its  log  does.  Thus we  are interested  in
log  HV(S)  = Xlog(V(s))
But  log(1+8*53E)  <  8*p3se.  Hence:
log  R V(S)  <  YX8*Pts
=6*E  IJ3s
The last is a geometric series, and thus converges.*
20Notes
1)  This  calculation  counts  as  a  single  strategy  any  two  strategies  whose  behaviors  diverge
only  after  a deviation,  not  by  one's  opponent  but  by  oneself.  Any  two  such  strategies  yield
identical rows  and columns  in  the normal  form.
2)  See Moulin  (1986)  for discussion of dominance  solvability.
3)  Implicit is  a  "Markov"  property:  only  the  current population  distribution affects  the  choice
of strategy for next period.
4)  Precisely  to  emphasize  this  "no  creation"  property,  Axelrod  refers  to  'he  dynamics  as
"ecological"  rather  than  "evolutionary"  However,  usage  here  is  consistent  with  that  in
(biological)  evolutionary game  theory.
5)  The  simulation  I  will  be  discussing  appears  on  pp.  48-53.  That  material  is  in  turn  taken
from  Axelrod  (1980),  where  the  results  of  his  set- '-  tournament  were  originally  presented.
The book also contains a  "territorial" rir'-lation  which  wiil  not be examined  here.
6)  More  accurately,  Axelrod  computed  the  payoff matrix  A,  used  in both  the  tournament  and
the  simulation,  as  the  average  of five  finite  games.  As  will  be  noted again  in  footnote  7,  this
complication is not of the essence.
7)  The  fact  that  A  is  actually  an  average  of five  games  (see  footnote  6)  is  not  consequential
from  the  point of view  of equilibrium  behavior.  If all  possible  strateges  are  present  then  by
the  usual  argument only  defection obtains  in Nash  equilibrium,  and defect always  is  the  unique
dominance  solution.
218)  Included  in  this  set  are  all  of  the  game's  pure  strategy  Nash  equilibria.  CIT  forms  a
symmetric pure  strategy equilibrium  with itself but so do  13  other (nice)  strategies.
9)  Extending Axelrod's  simulation  to  10,000 rounds brings the path  to  within  10 -7 of a slightly
different  Nash  equilibrium.  This  limit  also  has  all  39  nice  strategies  in  its  support  and
continues  to  give  weight  of  between  one  and  two  tenths  to  =FF  and  5  other  strategies.
Axelrod's conjecture  (p.55)  that  the  fraction of the  population  playing  CTT  would converge  to
1  is  probably  in  error.  Note,  incidentally,  that  I  have  not  claimed  that  the  path  in  this
simulation  actually  converges.  While  convergence  seems  highly  likely,  the  size  and
complexity  of  the  game  makes  analysis difficult.  In  the  simulations  of  the  next  section,  the
games are simple enough  that convergence  can  be formally demonstrated  in every case.
10)  In  particular,  DD  was  not  in  the  strategy  set.  Conceivably,  Axelrod's  game  may  admit
Nash  equilibria  in  which  defection  is  observed  in  some,  but  not  all,  stages  (these  would  be
mixed strategy equilibria;  see footnote  8).  However,  I  have  yet to find  any.
11)  Blad  considers  the  continuous  version  of  the  dynamics  used  here.  Hirshleifer  and
Martinez  Coll  consider  a  number  of  dynamics,  including  a  discrete  system  similar  to  the
replicator dynamics  but  not quite  identical  to it.
12)  When  the  number  of  stages  is  increased,  the  number  of  strategies  must  be  increased  as
well  to  preserve  dominance  solvability  to  DD.  See  the  discussion  at  the  beginning  of  the
section.
13)  In  the  language  of evolutionary  game  theory,  P7 
=  1 is  the  unique  evolutionarily  stable
strategy  (ESS;  Maynard  Smith  and  Price  1973;  see  also  Maynard  Smith  1982  and  Hofbauer
and  Sigmund  1988).
2214)  In fact,  G  is  a diffeomnorphism.  See  Losert and Akin  (1983).
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